

THE LAST STAGE OF THE ARMED MOVEMENT AGAINST THE SOVIET REGIME IN THE SAMARKAND REGION, THE REASONS FOR ITS DEFEAT AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STRUGGLE

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Abstract: *The article describes the activities of soldiers who fought against the Soviet power in the Samarkand region in 1924-1926, and their battles against the Red Army. At the same time, reports of the executive committee of the Samarkand district and the political department of the Turkestan front on the fight against "printing" are presented.*

Key words: *Kurbashi, Political Directorate of the Turkestan Front, City Executive Committee, Soviet power, S.M. Budyonny.*

INTRODUCTION

This armed struggle, which occupies a unique place in the history of the national liberation movements of the peoples of Turkestan, was also carried out in the Samarkand region in 1918-1926. The impact of the socio-political processes that took place in the region during this period on the armed movement in the Samarkand region, the chauvinistic policy of the Center and the Bolsheviks against the local peoples, the dynamics of the development of the armed movement (which was incorrectly interpreted as a "press" movement in historical studies during the Soviet era), the details of the battles against the Red Army, the leaders and their combat activities, in short, the essence of the armed movement, its national liberation character and the main forces of the movement, the reasons for its eventual defeat and the consequences of the struggle determine the relevance of this article.

METHODS AND LEVEL OF STUDY

This article is based on historical methods such as historicism, scientific, and territorial approaches, and provides information about the armed actions against the Red Army and protests against Soviet power in the Samarkand region in the first

quarter of the 20th century. On the eve of independence and in the early years of independence, a number of historians, publicists, and writers published studies in the spirit of a new approach to this problem [13].

RESEARCH RESULTS

The armed movement against the Soviet regime in the Samarkand region and the combat activities of the kurbashis played a significant role in the struggle in the Turkestan region. In 1918-1926, the independence fighters in the ranks of dozens of kurbashi groups led by Ochilbek and Bahrombek fought against the military forces of the Soviet government, including the Red Army units, GPU and CHAN detachments, militiamen, and various "volunteer squads". The activities of the kurbashis in this struggle were commendable, and therefore the representatives of the Soviet government, especially the communists and the Chekists, used all means to discredit them in front of the working masses. Most of the kurbashis who were not defeated or killed in the battles were eliminated by the Bolsheviks through cunning and deceit. The armed struggle against the Soviet regime continued in the Samarkand region after December 1924. Although the independence army was largely defeated at the end of 1924, fierce fighting against the Red Army continued in the region in 1925-1926.

The situation in Samarkand district was discussed at a meeting of the Central Commission for Combating the "Printing" under the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on January 3, 1925. The meeting, chaired by the chairman of the bureau, I.A. Zelensky, heard reports from the commander of the Turkestan Front and the extraordinary representative of the OGPU[1,239].

The meeting recognized that the "printing" movement was gradually dying out as a political movement in the Samarkand region, but the groups of the old "printing cadres" such as Hamrakul and Durdiboy, who had gathered around them the old "printing cadres", were still political in nature, and these groups needed to be eliminated first. In order to eliminate the groups of Hamrakul, Shish Vali, and Mirza Palvan fighting against the Red Army in Urgut, it was necessary to intensify military operations in the Urgut combat zone[2,609].

The meeting also approved the proposal of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Asian Bureau of the RCP (b) Central Committee of the Samarkand Regional

Committee to send a special commission of 30 communists to the Samarkand district (Urgut district) and Khujand district. It was decided that these communists would be removed from their posts in the regional and district centers and sent to these regions to carry out political propaganda work. The Regional Committee was advised to agree on the list of these communists with the military command and the OGPU [2,609].

As is known from history, in the fall of 1924, at the initiative of the Center, national-territorial demarcation was carried out in the Central Asian republics, and in February 1925, the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR, as well as other autonomous republics and regions, were formed. In April 1925, the capital of the Uzbek SSR was moved from Bukhara to Samarkand [4].

On the eve of the formation of the Uzbek SSR, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin visited Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Ashgabat, and the cities of the Fergana Valley. According to the Moscow newspaper "Trud", in February 1925, M. Kalinin, who arrived from Tashkent to Samarkand on a special train, was met at the station by the Chekists with the head of a local chieftain on a silver platter instead of salt and bread. The Chekists had been unable to catch him for many months, and only succeeded in doing so at the beginning of February 1925. Such a gift did not surprise the "All-Union elder", and he expressed his gratitude to the Chekists [5,28]. This evidence not only shows how low the moral image of the official leader of the Soviet state (after all, Kalinin was the President of the USSR at that time, in today's terms!) was, but also shows how evil and cunning the official bodies and representatives of the Soviet government in the region were, who, if necessary, used terror to constantly instill fear and anxiety in the hearts of the population.

According to archival documents, telegram 182, signed by the chairman of the Samarkand regional-city executive committee Mahmudov and sent to Tashkent at the end of 1924 to the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR (TurCIK), states that the head of the Samarkand district "printers" Zikir was killed. His head was brought to Samarkand [5.28]. This document, in our opinion, shows that the "head of the martyr" presented to Kalinin was not mentioned in vain.

According to the report of the Political Department of the Turkestan Front on the state of the fight against the "printers" prepared on April 15, 1925, "In the Samarkand region, the activity of local groups (Said Murod, Durdiboy, Abdu Razzaq, etc.) is observed, in addition to Mirza Palvan, fierce resistance in the battles. The "printers" who are surrendering individually, especially the Hamrakul group, which has lost the main part of its composition, do not stop. This situation was influenced by national demarcation and its spread among the masses..." [2,619].

At the plenum of the Samarkand regional city executive committee held on April 15-16, 1925[6,3] (in addition to the 24 members of the regional city executive committee headed by M. Urunkhodjaev, about 10 invited people also attended this meeting), the three-month report of the Presidium of the Samarkand regional city executive committee was heard: a) on the political situation in the region and b) on the Soviet construction and the lower apparatus. M. Urunkhodjaev, who made a report on this, reported in his speech that the following achievements had been made on the "printing" front in the three-month period from January 14 to April 10, when the Congress of Soviets of the Samarkand region was held in the region:

"There have been 4 large "printing gangs" in the Samarkand region so far:

1. Mirza Polvan group, consisting of 17 young men, in Samarkand uezd.
2. Hamrokulbek group, consisting of 30 young men, in Samarkand uezd.
3. Said Murad's group, consisting of 18 young men, in Oratepa region.
4. Turdiboy group, consisting of 22 young men, in Khojand uezd.

The first group was completely destroyed and crushed by the units of the Red Army on April 7, in the last battle, this group was separated from its leader Mirza Polvan and 10 people, 1 person was captured and 1 person hid in an unknown direction.

Hamrokulbek's group disbanded and its composition consists of only 3 people led by Hamrokulbek.

The Turdiboy and Saidmurad groups were also brought to an end: the first lost 13, the second lost 16 men.

The total losses of the "Printers" were as follows: 38 people were killed, 7 people were captured, 31 people surrendered voluntarily, 43 horses were captured, 2

horses were killed and one was wounded. Our losses were as follows: 7 Red soldiers were killed, 2 of whom were Uzbek GPU spies, 11 Red soldiers were wounded, one of whom was an Uzbek GPU spies, 17 horses were killed, 8 horses were wounded"[5,4]. Then the amount of weapons captured by the Red soldiers was indicated: 22 three-line rifles, 2 "tra" and 3 "berdanka" rifles, 38 hunting rifles, 17 rifles, 44 revolvers (drum-type multi-shot pistols) of various types, 2 binoculars, a large amount of cartridges (ammunition)[5,4].

According to the reference of the Political Department of the Turkestan Front on the fight against "printing" prepared on May 23, 1925, the population in the Samarkand region distanced themselves from the "printing" movement. The defeat of a number of groups (in particular, Mirza Palvan) has affected the tactics of the small-scale korbasi groups and their behavior. Each group has dispersed into small groups of 2-3 people and is behaving passively. The process of dispersal of the groups continues, and some young men are constantly surrendering. In the last week of April, 8 armed "pressmen" from different groups surrendered. According to Rajab Eshon, a captured assistant to Hamrakul, Hamrakul himself wants to surrender. In the Khujand combat zone, all forces are concentrated on eliminating the Said Murad group, the members of which have also split into 3-4 people, and Said Murad himself, who was wounded in the shoulder, is hiding in different villages with 3 young men [2,628].

According to official data from August 8, 1925, the groups of Said Murad and Durdiboy [Tur diboy] were liquidated in recent months. On July 1, Said Murad's assistant, Mullah Akhun, surrendered with 5 armed "printers", Said Murad himself died in one of the battles with the Red Army flying detachments in the Joygandan region (8 versts from Uratapa), and then a number of "printers" from his group surrendered to the Soviet authorities. In short, his group was liquidated. This can also be said about the deeply entrenched and well-established "Durdiboy bandit". Durdiboy, who had been hiding in Karatog for a long time, was killed on July 23. That is why small criminal groups are currently operating in the Samarkand region, but Durdiboy's assistant Abdulla Ponsod may have gathered the remaining members of the group - 10 people - and formed a separate group[2,641].

Analysis of such documents prepared by employees of the Political Department of the Turkestan Front, Chekists and border guards in 1923-1926 indicates that the struggle for independence in the Samarkand region did not stop during this period. Although the Samarkand kurbashis and independence fighters were defeated in a number of battles, and many kurbashis and young men died on the battlefields or were forced to surrender to the Red Army, new people were constantly joining their ranks. However, in the process of the struggle, the kurbashis constantly changed their tactics. If at first they attacked the Red Army units in groups of 500-1000 or even larger, then during the struggle the number of young men in the groups increased to 100-200 people, then to 40-50 or 15-20 people. At the final stage of the struggle, the patriots fought against the Soviet authorities individually in small groups of 3-5 or 2-3 people. Sometimes such small groups engaged in criminal activities, seizing food and other goods from the population.

In the very important official document “Report on the activities of the Executive Committee of the Samarkand Uyezd in 1923-1924” (this report was prepared at the beginning of 1925), Part V, entitled “The political situation in the Uyezd and the fight against printing”[6,30], the activities of 22 korbashis who operated in the city of Samarkand and its environs, that is, only in the Samarkand Uyezd, are analyzed, and valuable information is provided about the armed groups they led. The following excerpt from this document is quoted here:

“The printing movement is declining, but it has not been eliminated in any of the districts and uyezds of the region, and this movement is even penetrating the parts of the city of Samarkand inhabited by the indigenous (native Muslim) population. At the beginning of the reporting period, the following “printing gangs” were operating in the uyezd:

1. Hamrokul Rajab [Hamrokulbek], active since 1921, has 30 men, 75% of whom are armed with three-line rifles with sufficient ammunition, operates mostly in the Dargam district, in the area around the city.

2. Mirza Polvon, registered in 1922, has 25 men, 75% of whom are armed with three-line rifles with sufficient ammunition.

3. Zakir Narzullaev, registered in October 1923, has 8 men, armed with various weapons, operates in the Dargam district.

4. Sariboy, registered in December 1923, has 8 men, armed with 5 three-line rifles and 4 revolvers, operates in the Zarafshan district (former group of the Gadoy korbosh).

5. Kholikul, registered in 1922, has 20 men, 50% of whom are armed with three-line rifles, operates in the Panjikent district[6,30].

During the year, the following new groups emerged:

1. Rajab Eshon, has 18 men, operates in the Zarafshan district.
2. Rozik, has 18 men, operates in the Urgut district together with Kholikul.
3. Usta Ismail, has 21 men, operates in the Zarafshan district.
4. Isa, has 7 men, operates in the Zarafshan district (former group of the Sariboy korbosh).
5. Mama Yusuf, group composition unknown, operates in the Zarafshan district.

6. Yorqaraev, has 20 members.

7. Ziyovuddin, has 7 members.

8. Tursun Berdi.

9. Mamatkul.

10. Karim Polvan.

11. Mardi Khoja.

12. Sher Hayitov.

13. Rustam.

14. Zohid Sobir.

15. Aminbabo.

16. Arab [Turdi Arab].

17. Burkhan.[6,30]

Of these groups, only the following 8 currently exist and are active:

1. Hamrokul Rajabov.
2. Mirza Palvan.
3. Kholikul.

4. Raziq.
5. Rajab Eshon.
6. Usta Ismail.
7. Jesus.
8. Mama Yusuf.

The remaining 14 groups were either dispersed by force or surrendered voluntarily with the help of propaganda. In addition, such leaders as Ziyavuddin, Mamatkul, Ochilbek, Karim Palvan, Zohid Sabir, Aminbaba, Zakir, Turdi Arab were killed” [6,30].

It is characteristic that in this official document of the Soviet government, in addition to the groups of leaders whose names were mentioned above and who had gained “political support”, the following is said about mainly small hooligan and robber groups:

“Nine small robber groups, which were mainly engaged in various robberies and raids and did not have any political support or basis, were eliminated. All of them surrendered voluntarily as a result of propaganda. These groups (gangs) are as follows:

1. Eshon Khoja.
2. Ashur.
3. Taji.
4. Kenja.
5. Tagai.
6. Boymurad.
7. Egamberdi.
8. Energy.
9. Tursun Juraev”[6,30].

It was these groups, that is, some bandits and robbers, that the Bolsheviks used for their own interests, inciting them to join the groups of korboshi fighting against the Soviet regime, and with the help of such criminals they sought to eliminate the armed movement. This is confirmed by numerous official documents.

The above-mentioned report states that the Soviet authorities made great efforts to eliminate the “printing” movement in the Samarkand region, in particular in the Samarkand district. The work of combating the “printing” was headed by a special representative for the Samarkand district. Mirzhamolov stood at the head of these works, that is, both active military operations and propaganda work. The following deputies worked in the districts: in the Zarafshan district - Mirzakhoja Urunkhojaev with his employees Narzikul Yuldashev, Mamur Utashev and Rizo Kurbanov; in the Urgut district - Abduraim Abdushukurov, then Azimbekov and finally Urunkhodzhaev with his employees Mavlonov, Rustam Egamberdiev, Sadulla Juraboev and Kholbotirov; in the Dargam district – Mamedov with his employees Hakberdi Odilov, Buronov, Mulla Sultan Hakberdiev and Rustam Egamberdiev; in the Panjikent district, where there was no deputy representative, the representative himself led the struggle [6,31].

According to official documents of the Soviet government from 1924-1925, most of these documents are now kept in the Samarkand regional state archive, during which time many “printers” who were engaged in “printing and banditry” in the Samarkand region surrendered. Complete lists of those who surrendered are specifically provided in several “works” of the archive. One such document states that this document is called the register of “printers” who surrendered in 1924, and it lists the names, ages, regions and villages in which they operated, types of weapons, and groups of the kurbosh. This document is provided in Uzbek (with Arabic spelling) and Russian[6,470]. Another list lists only 15 young men who had surrendered in the Samarkand district, who were members of the Sarykboy korbashi (who was known as Sarykboy korbashi).

Another list, entitled “List of the Basmachy and small raiders who surrendered between April 25 and June 2, 1924,” lists 33 people.[6,483] The following lists concern the weapons of the surrendered “basmachy,” and mention the weapons seized from each korbashi or young man captured by the Soviet authorities in the Samarkand district.[6,550] These events were reflected in the memoirs of Mirzakhoja Urunkhodjaev, an active participant in the revolutionary processes in Samarkand and famous for cunningly eliminating his korboshes, later written as “Unforgettable

Days”: “After the Normat printer was crushed, the Samarkand city and district party organizations assigned me the task of eliminating the remaining printers in the Zarafshan district. The Zarafshan district consisted of 10 volosts, which included Tuyatortar, Kabut, Karakalpak, Polvonarik, Halvoyi, Eshimoksak, Chelak, Joyidevona, Shahob, Dahbed, in short, the territory of the present-day Jamboy, Bulungur, Narimonov, Payarik and Akdarya districts... Now the task of eliminating the Sariboi korboshe was looming. At that time, I was working as the chairman of the Samarkand regional military council and the executive committee of the regional council. That Together with the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Division Kalmykov, who was in Samarkand at that time, and the chairman of the GPU Shinord, we developed a plan to crush the Sariboy and Mardikhodzha gangs. The organization of the fight against the Mardikhodzha gang was entrusted to comrades Ternapolsky and Zelensky, and the elimination of the Sariboy gang was entrusted to the commander of the reserve cavalry detachment N.F. Noskov, Narzikul Yuldashev, and Hakberdi Polvon Odilov. I led both groups...

I divided the detachment into three parts and gave the order to launch an attack on Sariboy. The detachments surrounded the Sariboy gang. A battle broke out between the two, Sariboy was seriously wounded, fell from his horse, and was forced to surrender with his men”[7.113-119]. Although these kurbashis surrendered, many kurbashi groups actively participated in battles against the Red Army in the Samarkand region and neighboring regions, particularly in the Kashkadarya and Surkhandarya regions, in 1925-1926. For example, on October 24, 1926, a special meeting of the Surkhandarya Regional Council for Combating "Printing" (oblbasmsoveshchanie) in the city of Sherabad was attended by Validov (Deputy Secretary of the Surkhandarya Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan), Shevtsov (Chairman of the Surkhandarya Regional Committee), Isakhodzhaev (Deputy Chairman of the Surkhandarya Regional Executive Committee), Nikolaev (Head of the Surkhandarya Regional OGPU), Bronislavsky (Head of the 7th Special Brigade), Fadin (Commander of the 7th Cavalry Brigade), and Rakhimboev (Head of the Surkhandarya Regional Police), and discussed Fedin's "Report on the Political Situation in the Surkhandarya Region" [8,76]. The main

emphasis in the report is on the attitude towards Eshniyaz Amin (Eshniyaz Commander), a native of Baysun who was fighting against his former comrades-in-arms, the Korbashi, on the side of the Soviet authorities. Nikolaev, who attended the meeting, believes that today Eshnyaz is causing trouble for the Soviet government and the Red Army. We have repeatedly played a cat-and-mouse game with Eshnyaz and eventually won. He worked under our leadership and gained great influence among the population. I would like to briefly dwell on his activities: abuse of power, insulting and humiliating people, bribery, various false information, supporting the "printers", hiding those who supported the "printers" for various purposes, embezzlement and robbery, illegal collection of taxes and revenues, preparing fake letters in the name of Soviet commissars and distributing provocative messages. All this is confirmed by factual evidence. For example, the original letter from Eshnyaz to the representative of the Dugoba Village Council states that even if the planting campaign is ruined, he will not punish the guilty or impose a fine of 100 rubles on them. The second piece of evidence: he allowed Said Menglikulov to cut down 60 trees. The third piece of evidence: he removed Karaev from the chairmanship of the Village Council (selsovet) and appointed Khojakul aksakal in his place. There are many similar examples. Some say that Eshnyaz should not be touched now, that it would be a mistake to arrest him. In fact, several people should be arrested along with him [9,78].

Shevtsov, who attended this meeting, expressed the following opinion: "At this time, it is necessary to take into account the considerations of the military command. What Fedin said should have been done earlier. Taking such a step at this time is nothing more than a risk. Because the political situation in the region is complicated, and if groups hostile to us transfer the fight against the "printing" to the local authorities, this will not work in our favor. That is why it is necessary to clearly distinguish between small criminal gangs and large groups, and of course, the police should fight against small criminal groups" [9,77].

Validov partially objected to the views of Isakhodzhaev, who strongly opposed the activities of Eshnyaz at this meeting, and emphasized that Eshnyaz should consider the ideas that Eshnyaz was once the best employee, but now he is the

worst, that Eshnyaz cannot be neutralized now, that the military units intend to transfer the fight against the “printing” to the police, but the police and the Soviet apparatus are not ready for this. Perhaps we should hold new elections to the Soviets or transfer Eshnyaz from his job in Baysun to Sherabad. If we reduce Eshnyaz's position now and squeeze him out, we will make a big political mistake, but if we call him to the regional center without any good reason, tomorrow 1,000 people will come here to support him. He should be sent to Samarkand, while the GPU officers should be engaged in work that will reduce his authority among the population. In addition, political workers should be sent to Eshnyaz's volunteer detachment[9,77].

In his closing remarks at the meeting, Fedin spoke about Eshnyaz and expressed the following opinion: “This issue has not been raised before, and all the materials have stopped somewhere. In my opinion, it is not right to continue to collect these materials for another 7-8 months and then hold Eshnyaz accountable. I am against this and will stick to my opinion on this issue. I will put the issue this way: Eshnyaz’s detachment can be disbanded, leaving only 10 people to defend himself. Eshnyaz himself should engage in agriculture, I learned from our conversations that he intends to engage in grain cultivation [9,77]. Nikolaev added to these thoughts and emphasized that Eshnyaz should definitely be brought to court, citing various reasons, because he has harmed the Bolshevik policy and does not reckon with the local authorities, and he puts himself above them. He should be removed from our path, but not by sending him to Samarkand, which will further strengthen his authority. I think that the GPU should resolve this issue as soon as possible and present its proposals to the regional committee, presenting the ideas about Eshnyaz's arrest and such a call as the opinion of the local population [9,76].

At this meeting, which decided the fate of the red commander Eshnyaz Amin, who did great work in strengthening Soviet power in the Surkhandarya region, in particular in Baysun, and the “printers”, the following decision was made:

“1. The responsibility for combating petty criminal bandits should be placed on the criminal investigator and the police.

2. Due to the weakness of the criminal investigator and the police, comrades such as Nikolaev, Isakhodzhaev and Rakhimbaev should be instructed to submit the

issue of the state of the police and criminal investigation to the regional committee meeting for discussion in order to urgently resolve it...

3. The issue of Eshnyaz should be submitted to Nikolaev for consideration, and he should come up with specific proposals and make a report at the meeting of the regional committee secretariat.

The term of the commission shall be fixed until November 1 of the current year”[9,75].

Indeed, shortly after November 1926, Eshnyaz Amin Yunusov was first removed from his post by the Soviet authorities. During the collective farm regime, he was the head of the organization of the “Kahramon” collective farm. In 1930, Eshnyaz, who had gone to dig the Kumkurgan ditch, was arrested. The Surkhandarya district court sentenced Eshnyaz to be shot in July 1931, but the special troika under the Central Asian Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee commuted the death sentence to 10 years in prison in August 1932[10,222]. Eshnyaz was sent to the Magadan forests. Eshnyaz Amin himself was born in the village of Kushbulak in the Baysun district, and during the emirate he served as a village elder. After the abolition of the Bukhara Emirate, he was first sent to the Red Army participated in the independence struggle against. However, he later switched to the side of the Soviet authorities and showed great courage in eliminating various korbashis operating in Baysun, Sherabad, and Denov, in particular, on December 30, 1925, the group of Salombek korbashis[11] (Salom Kalta). He became an aksakal of the Soviet authorities in the village of Kushbulak, where he was born. However, Eshniaz, who served the Soviet authorities with such loyalty, died in Magadan. Before his arrest, he worked as a commander of a voluntary Muslim detachment and the head of the Baysun militia. Like many korbashis operating in Samarkand, Eshniaz Amin's life ended tragically far from his homeland, not from enemy bullets on the battlefield, but as a result of the actions of the Chekists and some traitors, as a result of malicious slander and intrigue. We must not forget such bitter lessons of history.

Official documents of the Soviet government record September 1, 1925 as the day of the end of the “printing” movement in the Samarkand region. In addition to

members of the struggle against “printing”, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan V. Ivanov, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Uzbek SSR Y. Akhunboboev and others participated in a grand celebration held in Samarkand on this occasion[7,119]. At that time, the city of Samarkand was the capital of the newly formed Uzbek SSR.

According to the report document between the I and II Congresses of the Executive Committee of the Samarkand Regional Soviets held in 1925, from February 1, 1925 to the beginning of September, 21 five-shot rifles, 1 English rifle, 2 berdankas, 10 pistols, 5 Mausers, 2 swords, 43 horses, 2 binoculars and a large amount of ammunition were captured from the “printers”. A large amount of weapons hidden by them was also found. In addition, as a result of the explanatory work, 34 five-shot rifles, 2 English rifles, 4 berdankas, 36 various pistols and other weapons, as well as several thousand bullets were taken from the surrendered “printers” [6, 37-40].

However, even after September 1925, the independence fighters waged merciless battles against the Red Army in the Samarkand region. This is confirmed by numerous official documents and archival information.

On the special instructions of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) I.V. Stalin and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov, the hero of the Russian Civil War, the famous commander Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny (1883 - 1973), was sent to Tashkent in March 1926 to completely eliminate the “printers” movement in the Central Asian republics. S. Budyonny visited the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR and the Tajik ASSR in March-August 1926. He held a series of meetings of the Special Council for Combating the "Printing" Movement in the cities of Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Termez, Fergana, Stalinabad (now Dushanbe), Ashgabat, with the participation of the command of the Turkestan Front and the leadership of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Asian Bureau of the CPSU (b), the responsible secretaries of the Communist Parties of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. One of such meetings was held on March 31, 1926 in Samarkand, where, in addition to S.M. Budyonny, the commander of the Turkestan Front K.A. Avksentievisky and the responsible secretary of the Central

Asian Bureau of the CPSU (b) I.A. Zelensky, as well as the leaders of the Uzbek SSR and the Samarkand region, took part, and the task was set to quickly and within a short period of time eliminate the "printing" movement in the region [12,358-395]. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Uzbek SSR appointed S.M. Budyonny was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Uzbek SSR for his active participation in the suppression of the "printing" movement.

By a resolution of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council of June 4, 1926, the Turkestan Front was abolished, and the Central Asian Military District was established on its basis.[12,390] The fighters of the Central Asian Military District intensified the fight against the independence fighters. In general, by the end of 1926, the independence movement in the Samarkand region was completely defeated.

CONCLUSION

The reasons for the defeat of the armed movement in the Samarkand region and the lessons of the struggle in our opinion were as follows:

Firstly, after the end of the first period of the independence movement in the Turkestan region (1918-1924), there were no mass fighting movements against the Soviet regime in the Samarkand region since 1925.

Secondly, when the second period of the armed movement (1925-1935) began, the territory of the Samarkand region was not one of the important centers of the independence movement, as it had been in the previous period. At that time, the main centers of the armed movement remained only the territories of Eastern Bukhara and the Khorezm oasis.

Thirdly, as a result of the national-territorial demarcation carried out in the Central Asian republics at the end of 1924 and the formation of the Uzbek SSR and other allied and autonomous republics and regions in February 1925, the armed movement in the Samarkand region also lost its mass character. The armed movement was no longer supported by the majority of the people (peasants, artisans, intellectuals, etc.).

Fourth, as a result of the Russo-Polish War (1919-1921) and the end of the civil war in Russia at the end of 1922, large military forces of Soviet Russia (from December 30, 1922, of the Soviet Union) were thrown into Turkestan. In 1923-1925,

the main forces of the Samarkand region insurgents were crushed by the Red Army. The last groups of kurbashi in the region were liquidated in 1926.

Fifth, the Soviet state and the Communist Party, presenting the independence movement in the eyes of the entire people as a "smear" movement, carried out a huge campaign of propaganda and propaganda against them. The local party, Soviet, economic, and military bodies of Soviet power focused all their attention on the fight against the insurgents, primarily through cunning and treachery, eliminating the ringleaders who were the leaders of the struggle.

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